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ABSTRACT
This thesis represents a link in a long chain of recent Western scholarship that has
attempted to bring the work of Ibn Khaldun, the late 14th century Tunisian jurist and historian,
into the mainstream of historiographic, political, and sociological learning. Why Ibn Khaldun?
What makes his work stand out among the classics of pre-modern and early-modern political and
social theory? Why are his ideas still relevant to the study of politics and societies today? My
thesis attempts to answer these questions through the lenses of comparative political theory and
theoretical reinterpretation.
The study hinges on a thematic comparison of Ibn Khaldun’s major ideas to those authors
considered mainstays in the pantheon of Western social science: Thucydides, Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel. Such comparison is necessary, I believe, to emphasize the vast
contextual differences among the authors while simultaneously highlighting their many
theoretical similarities. By doing so, I demonstrate both the surprisingly contemporary relevance
and lasting theoretical value of Ibn Khaldun’s conceptualization of political power, the state, and
social change.
Through careful comparison, this study attempts to simultaneously deepen and strengthen
extant understandings of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas while unearthing additional aspects either
marginalized or neglected by the predominant scholarship. Moreover, it seeks to demonstrate Ibn
Khaldun’s lasting contribution and value to the modern social sciences—especially as it relates
to the study of political rebellion and social change
ii
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Throughout the winter and spring of 2010-2011, multiple states in the Middle East and
North Africa began a process of radical sociopolitical transformation. After decades of forcibly
suffering the rule of foreign-backed autocrats, exploitative economic policies, and social
humiliation, a multi-class, multi-ethnic, and multi-confessional majority stood up to voice their
anger and demand immediate reform. From Morocco in the West to Bahrain in the East, few—if
any—Arab states were left untouched by the infectious political protests initiated by rural
Tunisians in mid-December.
The popular narrative of the process goes something like this: on 17 December 2010, a
desperate young fruit vendor from the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid set himself on fire outside
the provincial government building to protest the rampant corruption and injustice endemic to
the local and national governments. In so doing, Mohamed Bouazizi unwittingly sparked
multiple waves of mass protest across the Middle East that have, to date, successfully unseated
Tunisian President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Libyan “Brother Leader” Muammar Gaddafi. Popularly
referred to as the “Arab Spring” among Western media outlets, these waves of political uprising
had and will continue to have far-reaching implications for democratic activism and agitation
throughout the region.
Interestingly, though perhaps unsurprisingly, the waves of popular discontent made their
way to Europe and North America where, disgusted by the continued immiseration of the middle
1

and lower classes of society, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in opposition of their
governments—some to protest, others to ‘occupy’. Although dramatically different in scope and
substance from their Arab cousins, these Western protest movements share with them an
important underlying concern: potential social collapse driven by the predation of the ruling class
and systemic injustice. How can we better understand this unity?
For, as government officials and social activists seek to chart new ways forward, we in
the academy are charged with looking backward in hopes of making some kind of sense of the
still ongoing phenomena. While many political scientists are busy building their models,
designing multivariable matrices for their large- or small-N regressions, or constructing
parameters for their case studies, I suggest an alternative strategy: comparative theory. But then
we must ask, which theories and why?
While watching events unfold in the Middle East in January 2011, I asked these same
questions. Are there figures from the past to whom we can look to make better sense of ongoing
events? Do the insights of ancient or modern thinkers still apply in the fast-paced, high-tech
world of our self-proclaimed ‘post-modernism’? The answer at which I arrived remains,
unequivocally, yes. And the ideas of one thinker in particular struck me as especially deserving
of a contemporary rereading and reappraisal: those of Ibn Khaldun.
Ibn Khaldun was a 14th century Islamic jurist, scholar, and politician whose ideas on
society, politics, social change, and the philosophy of history have influenced thinkers the world
over for the past eight centuries. From Montesquieu in the 18th century to Ernest Gellner in the
20th, Ibn Khaldun’s ideas exert considerable force within blocs of the social sciences, but they
are seldom considered in contemporary contexts. I therefore intend to reexamine Ibn Khaldun’s
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major work of theory, The Muqaddimah (literally, ‘introduction’), in light of the recent global
upheavals.

Why Ibn Khaldun?

This study represents a link in a long chain of recent Western scholarship that attempts to
bring the work of Ibn Khaldun into the mainstream of political and sociological thinking—
particularly within Anglophone academe. But why Ibn Khaldun? What makes his work stand out
among the classics of ancient, medieval, and modern political theory? Why are his ideas still
relevant to the study of politics today?
As this study will attempt to illuminate, Ibn Khaldun occupies a unique place not only
among the thinkers of his time, but among the most powerful and compelling thinkers in
recorded history. The complex system of examining and understanding human society he lays
out in preface to his ‘world history’ remains among the greatest achievements of individual
genius yet written. To briefly summarize: Ibn Khaldun fused the extant knowledge of his time—
Islamic and Neo-Platonic philosophy, natural science, historiography, and Islamic ethics—with a
self devised science of “human civilization and social organization” that incorporated the study
of politics, economics, and sociology to construct what he hoped would be a holistic account of
the social processes underlying the rise and fall of “civilized” societies.1 The dialectically
cyclical system of historical social change he developed, and the socio-philosophical
mechanisms that drive it, stood unmatched in their intellectual complexity and force until the
philosophies of history developed by Hegel and Marx.
1

Muqaddimah, I Preliminary Remarks, pp. 38-39. All references to the Muqaddimah are given by Book, Section,
and Page Number, and are found in: Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History, translated and
edited by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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History, however, is replete with theories of cyclical power shifts, civilizational
evolution, and imperial implosion in regional and international affairs. What makes the ideas of
Ibn Khaldun any more interesting or convincing than these? Some contemporary scholars point
to the “broad similarities” between Ibn Khaldun’s time and our own, noting that he lived in a
“twilight world of transition between the rise and fall of dynasties which he sought to
understand.”2 Therefore, the logic follows, “lessons” can be “extracted” from his thinking to
generate “alternative conceptualizations of historical change in our time.”3 Indeed, many
similarities do appear—at least on the surface—between the modern era and his, and, combined
with a morbid fascination with imperial decay (particularly rampant in U.S. foreign policy
circles, e.g.), may explain the steadily growing appeal of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas. Although
tempting, this line of inquiry tends more often than not to be self-fulfilling: we see too much of
ourselves in the work of the author, instead of letting the ideas speak.
While I agree lessons can be drawn from the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, I propose an
alternative means of “extraction.” Whereas some authors are simply content to find the cookiecutter temporal and ideational parallels, I argue we must first get a solid grip on the ideas
themselves. We must understand what Ibn Khaldun means and why. To get there requires
systematic comparison and differentiation to the ideas with which we are most familiar.
Therefore, we must ask questions like, ‘How do Ibn Khaldun’s conceptions of “man,” the
“state,” and history compare to those of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, or Hegel?’
‘What do comparisons between Ibn Khaldun’s theories of popular revolt and those of leading
modern scholars of revolution?’ By engaging these questions within the broader context of

2

Seifudein Adem, “Decolonizing Modernity: Ibn Khaldun and Modern Historiography,” in Islam: Past, Present and
Future, eds. Jaffary Awang, Ahmad Sunawari Long, and Kamaruddin Salleh (Bangi: Department of Theology and
Philosophy, Faculty of Islamic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaam Malaysia, 2004): 570.
3
Ibid.
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contemporary political change, I intend to demonstrate Ibn Khaldun’s lasting contribution and
value to the modern social sciences.

Why Comparative Political Theory?

A comparative examination of political theory gives us the tools we need to begin asking
the best questions of sociopolitical phenomena. But, comparative political theory is tricky—if for
no other reason than the texts and ideas often investigated have been discussed, debated, and
critiqued for decades, centuries, or even millennia. To conduct comparative political theory is to
jump into the deep end of the history of human ideas, hoping not to drown. Therefore, it is
imperative that I spell out exactly what I intend to do in this study, how I intend to do it, and why
I think it important, before taking the plunge.
In a somewhat recent Review of Politics article, Andrew F. March makes the case that,
“Comparison must be, in the first place, a method, not just an expedient term vaguely suggesting
the focus of one’s research interests (e.g., non-Western texts) or substantive concerns and
commitments (e.g., critiquing Western hegemony).”4 To conduct comparative political theory,
there must be a visible process that traces, links, and critiques the ideas we seek to illuminate.
Moreover, there must be a goal—an understanding—we seek to achieve through comparison,
rather than simply throwing concepts into matrices to see how they relate to one another. March
proposes five methods of comparative political theory fit these criteria, two of which I employ
here.

4

Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?” The Review of Politics 71 (2009): 535.
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The first of these methods is the history of political thought, which, for March, includes
“intellectual history, Begriffsgeschichte, and the study of important thinkers.”5 Fancy German
terms aside, the method is one of tracing the ideas of “important thinkers” through historical
research. In this process, we ask questions like, ‘How did the author’s sociopolitical and
intellectual milieus shape his/her ideas?’ or ‘What does the author’s personal and professional
biography tell us about his/her thinking?’ The process is part historical-contextual and part
intellectual-biographical. In the case of Ibn Khaldun, for example, the method necessitates an
extensive examination of the man’s social, political, familial, and intellectual contexts within the
broader perspective of the time and place in which he lived.
The second of March’s methods I use is critical analysis and interpretation, which
attempts to unearth “the hidden, denied, unrecognized, or unacknowledged underneath the
visible, the apparent, or the hegemonic.”6 This aspect of my study is by far the most important,
for it represents an attempt at epistemic inclusivity. That is, through extensive comparative
analysis with the ‘Great Books’ of the Western political and social canons, I strive to bring the
ideas of Ibn Khaldun, a pre-modern Muslim thinker from North Africa, back into the
conversations of contemporary political theory. In doing so, I follow the advice established by
Roxanne Euben who argues,

The project of political theory introduces non-Western perspectives into familiar debates about the
problems of living together, thus ensuring that “political theory” is about human and not merely
Western dilemmas. It is perhaps best understood as a hybrid of the contemporary disciplines of
political theory and comparative politics, for it entails the attempt to ask questions about the nature
and value of politics in a variety of cultural and historical contexts…This approach builds upon
the possibility that disparate cultures are not worlds apart, morally and cognitively
incommensurable, but exist in conversation with one another. 7
5

Ibid, 534.
Ibid.
7
Roxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, a Work of
Comparative Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 9-10.
6

6

Thus, through the process of close comparison with the giants of the Western canon, I hope to
establish Ibn Khaldun as a central figure in political and social theory—a figure whose ideas still
have much to teach us about the dynamics of contemporary society and the process of social
change.

Reading Ibn Khaldun in a Modern Comparative Perspective: Some Initial Concerns

The potential dangers inherent to a study like this are many. In reading political theory,
particularly a work from a distant past and place, many temptations leading to spurious
conclusions and self-reflective interpretations arise. It is easy, for example, to become
mesmerized by Ibn Khaldun’s seemingly ‘modern’ arguments and therefore interpret and ascribe
wildly anachronistic ideas to him. In our fascination with his supposed ‘modernity’, we don’t
realize that the attempt to take his ideas and stuff them into categories that fit our modern
concerns does irreparable violence to the original oeuvre and its meanings.8 We cannot ‘update’
Ibn Khaldun to suit our own times.
Another pitfall is to paint Ibn Khaldun as an island of proto-Western rationality in a sea
of religious backwardness or the precursor of some modern academic discipline like sociology,
as many do.9 In either case, Khalid Chaouch writes, readers “tend to ‘forget’ that he was a
fourteenth century historian.”10 More importantly, Ibn Khaldun was a fourteenth century Islamic
scholar and jurist. No matter how irreligious—even anti religious at times—his writing may

8

Khalid Chaouch, “Ibn Khaldun In Spite of Himself,” The Journal of North African Studies 13 (2008): 288.
See, for example, Ernest Gellner, “Cohesion and Identity: the Maghreb from Ibn Khaldun to Emile Durkheim,”
Government and Opposition 10 (1975): 203-218.
10
Chaouch, “Ibn Khaldun In Spite of Himself,” 285.
9
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appear, it is impossible to divorce Ibn Khaldun’s thought from the realities of his life, his time, or
his social milieu. In the introduction to his classic work, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History,
Mushin Mahdi sums up these concerns perfectly. Madhi argues that one cannot understand or
explain Ibn Khaldun’s thought by:

Summarizing and paraphrasing [his] conclusions; or through the method of explaining them as the
product of certain historical conditions; or by interpreting them as the product of an unconscious
desire to create a ‘positive’, ‘historical’, or ‘truly scientific’ science of society; or by studying Ibn
Khaldun as a ‘precursor’ of modern social science, and considering his concern with philosophic
and religious matters as residues of the prejudices and dogmatisms of the Middle Ages from which
a Muslim thinker in the fourteenth century could not liberate himself.11

Considering these cautions, I make every attempt to read Ibn Khaldun as he was, not as I might
consciously or subconsciously wish him to be. Moreover, the lessons I glean from the text are
collected with an emphasis on contextual skepticism: just because it sounds good doesn’t mean it
is good.
Structure of the Thesis
Understanding the necessity of providing a rich contextual foundation to Ibn Khaldun’s
central ideas, this study begins with a discussion of the man and his times. The chapter (Chapter
Two) takes great care to describe the social, political, and economic conditions in the fourteenth
century Maghreb that shaped the life, career, and thought of Ibn Khaldun. I trace the major
events in the medieval Western Islamic world that produced the social and political realities Ibn
Khaldun analyzed in his Muqaddimah, and I examine how his religious training and political
career affected that analysis.

11

Mushin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of
Culture (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957): 9.
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Chapter Three begins the investigation of Ibn Khaldun’s political thought by delving into
the foundational assumptions he makes about human beings and how those assumptions relate to
his conception of sovereignty and government. To make his points more accessible and poignant,
I compare and contrast them to the ideas of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes. This discussion
lays the foundation for the following explication of Ibn Khaldun’s core theoretical proposition.
Chapter Four deals exclusively with Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ‘asabiyya (social cohesion
and solidarity). Through careful comparison to the heuristic concepts of social organization and
mobilization developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G. W. F. Hegel, this chapter digs at the
essence of the uniquely human construct Ibn Khaldun considers to be the sine qua non of social
change and historical progress. Specifically, I trace the roots of ‘asabiyya and chart its social
development from inchoate tribalism to institutionalized nationalism.
In Chapter Five, the discussion of ‘asabiyya shifts its focus from development to decay.
In this section, we confront the harsh realities of what Ibn Khaldun considers to be the fate of all
nations: slow, degenerative collapse. To better grasp this concept of state collapse and the
inexorable process of social decay, I compare Ibn Khaldun’s ‘vicious cycle’ analysis of
‘asabiyya and “royal authority” to the economic and social ideas of Niccolo Machiavelli and
John Locke. I conclude with an assessment of Ibn Khaldun’s social prognoses relative to the
contemporary world.
Building upon these comparative readings of The Muqaddimah, Chapter Six presents the
major problems of contemporary interpretations in Khaldunian scholarship and seeks to amend
them. I argue that popularized understandings of Ibn Khaldun miss a great deal of his complexity
by (1) attempting to secularize his views on politics and social change, and (2) focusing
exclusively on external actors as the harbingers of dynastic collapse. By reclaiming Ibn
9

Khaldun’s Islamic ethics and bringing domestic forces back into the picture, I conclude that Ibn
Khaldun’s ideas gain substantially greater weight in offering compelling philosophical lenses
through which to examine modern and contemporary history.

10

CHAPTER TWO: IBN KHALDUN – HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
Life and Times
Abu Zayd ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami, known to the world
simply as Ibn Khaldun, was born in Tunis in 1332 CE. He came from a wealthy and politically
prestigious family, the Banu Khaldun, which had emigrated from Al-Andalus after the fall of
Cordoba and Seville during the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula from Islamic rule in the
mid-13th century. His family’s status emanated first from its long history of political and military
service to the Umayyad, Córdoban, Almoravid, and Almohad dynasties in Al-Andalus.12 Second,
the Banu Khaldun’s Arab and Berber pedigree cemented its status among the Andalusian and,
later, Hafsid Tunisian elite. In his autobiography, for example, Ibn Khaldun traces his paternal
roots back to the first days of Islam in the southern Hadramut region of Yemen. 13 More
important than his family’s status and station in Tunis, however, were the social, cultural, and
political contexts into which he was born.
Historical accounts of the political, economic, social, and intellectual conditions in the
14th century Maghreb vary greatly depending on the source. As Bruce Lawrence writes, for
example,

12
13

Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun: The Birth of History and the Past of the Third World (London: Verso, 1984): 36-37
Allen J. Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010): 42-43.
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At the intersection of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim influences, heir to Greek science and Arabic
poetry, and connected by trade and history to Asia, the Mediterranean Sea had become the nexus
of Muslim cosmopolitanism by the fourteenth century.14

Yves Lacoste agrees, seeing Islamic North Africa as a political sphere “fully independent” from
the political centers of Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, though culturally and economically
inseparable from the greater Islamic Middle East.15 Contrary to popular assumptions, he writes,
“It [the Maghreb] was neither a remote outpost of the Muslim world nor a sort of backward ‘wild
west’.”16 For both Lawrence and Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun’s time appears to be one of relative
commercial prosperity, technological advance, and intellectual achievement.
A more circumspect analysis comes from Marshall Hodgson. In the second volume of
The Venture of Islam, Hodgson argues that the collapse of the Almohad Empire in 1269 CE
created isolated and unstable emirates throughout North Africa and the remnants of Muslim
Spain whose ingenuity was forced to shift from social, economic, and intellectual endeavors to
defending themselves from constant external threat.17 Hodgson writes, “As compared with India
or Rûm (southeastern Europe), the whole Maghrib [sic] was relatively isolated from the central
Islamicate lands,” and, by extension, removed from the ongoing advances in learning, science,
and technology taking place in the budding Ottoman Empire and Persia.18
Indeed, to Ibn Khaldun the time and place could hardly have looked bleaker. As Mushin
Mahdi puts it, “The picture of the Islamic world during the fourteenth century as depicted by Ibn

14

Bruce Lawrence, “Introduction to the 2005 Edition,” in The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated
by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005): vii.
15
Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun, 15.
16
Ibid, 16.
17
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization, Volume Two, The
Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974): 477.
18
Ibid, 478.
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Khaldun…is one of general decline and disintegration.”19 Ibn Khaldun had been born within
living memory of Mongols’ sack of Baghdad in 1258 CE. Arguably the most collectively
traumatizing event in pre-modern Islamic history, the allied Mongol army under Hulagu Khan
spent one week obliterating the city’s infrastructure and systematically exterminating its
inhabitants; among the numerous casualties was the last caliph of the Abbasid Empire, AlMustasim, executed by being wrapped in a carpet and trampled to death by Mongol horsemen. 20
The catastrophe shattered the four-century old Sunni political order throughout the Middle East
and marked the end of the so-called ‘Golden Age of Islam.’
While the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate loomed large in the collective memory of
Muslims throughout the medieval Islamic world, Baghdad and Abbasid politics were far
removed from the social, cultural, and political milieu of Ibn Khaldun’s family. Instead, for
nearly five centuries the sociopolitical epicenter of the Banu Khaldun lay within the westernmost
outpost of the Islamic world: Al-Andalus. Therefore, the lingering trauma that most affected Ibn
Khaldun’s worldview and work was not the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, but rather the
continuing Spanish Reconquista and steady decline of Muslim Spain.21
In his extensive genealogical research, Ibn Khaldun had traced his family’s presence in
Al-Andalus back to the Umayyad conquest of Iberia in the early-8th Century. For the better part
of five centuries, the Banu Khaldun had distinguished itself both in battle and statecraft, rising to
prominence as one of the most powerful families in Seville.22 According to Lacoste, “many
historians” in medieval North Africa and Al-Andalus noted the fame of the Banu Khaldun in
Andalusian political, military, and intellectual history; the male members of the family were
19

Mushin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of
Culture (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957): 26.
20
Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times, 7.
21
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 479.
22
Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun, 36-37.
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well-regarded political advisors, religious scholars, and generals. 23 But no matter how gifted in
battle or political negotiation the family may have been, they could do nothing to stop the glacial
progress of the Reconquista.
Against the backdrop of sporadic warfare and growing internal political division, the
Banu Khaldun found themselves—like most Muslims in Al-Andalus—under increasingly
mounting pressure at the beginning of the 13th century. Although the Christian kingdoms of
Leon, Castile, Aragon, and Navarre could rarely agree on anything, they combined their military
strength with the singular intent of driving the “Moors” back across the Straits of Gibraltar.24 By
around 1230 CE, they appeared poised to make significant territorial gains as their armies moved
south and their politicians worked to spread factional chaos among the steadily disintegrating
Almohads. Like many others, the Banu Khaldun read the proverbial ‘writing on the wall’ and left
Seville several years before its capitulation to the Spanish coalition in 1236 CE.25 Not long
afterwards, in 1248 CE, Cordoba fell to the Christians, leaving only Granada as “the last outpost”
of Muslim Al-Andalus.26 The Almohad dynasty imploded soon thereafter in 1269 CE, thus
creating the fractured political landscape into which Ibn Khaldun was born.
The Almohad dynasty had at one point united North Africa from Marrakesh to Tripoli
and controlled Al-Andalus from Gibraltar to Barcelona.27 By the time Ibn Khaldun reached
adulthood, however, little remained of the Almohads’ legacy. North Africa was divided into
three incessantly warring dynasties: the Marinids in what is now Morocco, the Zayyanids in
western Algeria, and the Hafsids in eastern Algeria and Tunis.28 Each vied for power over the
23

Ibid, 37.
R. A. Fletcher, “Reconquest and Crusade in Spain, c. 1050-1150,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 37
(1987): 35.
25
Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun, 37-38.
26
Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times, 69.
27
Ibid, 11-15.
28
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 477.
24
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others, but none ever truly achieved it. It was an era of internecine warfare, political intrigue and
opportunism, when alliances were made, broken, and remade in rapid succession. It was an era
of slow internal decay, when even intense domestic disputes could not overshadow the constant
threat of nomadic Arab and Berber raiders and the steady advance of Christian Europe towards
political ascendency.29 Furthermore, it was the era of the Black Death.
Ibn Khaldun was a sixteen year-old student when the plague reached Tunis in 1348. Over
the course of one year, it infected and killed his parents, all of his teachers, and many of his
extended relations. Of his immediate family, only he and his two brothers survived the Black
Death.30 According to Fromherz, the effects of the plague dramatically impacted Ibn Khaldun’s
thinking on public sanitation, urban life, and urbanization for the worse, and even inspired him to
write the Muqaddimah later in life. While this latter-day psychoanalysis is something of an
analytical stretch, one cannot deny the trauma such compounding losses must have inflicted on
the young man.
In spite of the tragedies wrought by the plague, Ibn Khaldun continued his education,
determined to master the subjects he had studied from an early age before embarking on a career
in politics. Thanks to his family’s wealth, privilege, and political status, Ibn Khaldun had
received the best education available, studying under the sharpest minds in North Africa and
developing a remarkably diverse academic vita. As Fromherz argues, Ibn Khaldun was among
the last and privileged few educated in such manner—outside the watchful eye of the newly
created state sanctioned and controlled school system.31 The relative intellectual freedom given
by his teachers may, for example, explain both the astonishing disciplinary breadth of Ibn

29

Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History, 22-23.
Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times, 53-54.
31
Ibid, 46.
30
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Khaldun’s education as well the emphasis he later placed upon critical thinking and intellectual
creativity in his work.
As a child, Ibn Khaldun undertook his initial Qur’anic training (rote memorization and
recitation) under the tutelage of his father, a practicing Sufi and Maliki scholar. 32 As a young
man, he expanded his religious studies through his teachers, studying Qur’anic tafsir (exegesis),
its multiple ahadith (traditions of the Prophet) collections, learning the fundamentals of Maliki
fiqh (jurisprudence), and studying the theosophy of Sufi mysticism.33 This extensive training had
a profound effect on Ibn Khaldun, who would later assert that, in spite of humanity’s capacity for
reason and critical thought, only the “phenomenon of prophecy” offered people a legitimate
source of social values and institutions.34
Beyond his religious studies, Ibn Khaldun received instruction in literature, poetry,
Arabic linguistics, foreign languages, biographical and historical sciences, and scholarly writing.
Furthermore, he was schooled in the “modern” Hellenistic fields of mathematics, logic, natural
philosophy, and metaphysics.35 In addition to reading Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, Ibn
Khaldun was also well versed in Islamic philosophy, studying the works of al-Farabi, al-Razi, alTusi, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Sinna, among others.36 This wide-ranging exposure to Classical Greek
and Islamic philosophy inspired both his academic pursuits and his penchant for critical,
rationalist inquiry. It was Ibn Khaldun’s career in royal politics, however, that would provide
him the unique perspective and insight with which to critically analyze history, authority, and
social change.
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At the age of twenty, Ibn Khaldun entered his first position in Hafsid politics: apprentice
to the court calligrapher. Although he later described the job as both menial and mind numbing,37
it placed him on a career trajectory that, today, reads like a political thriller. If, indeed, western
North Africa and Muslim Spain were, as Mahdi suggests, “border-countries where political
adventurers and sectarian visionaries sought their fortunes,”38 Ibn Khaldun must have played
politics in a league unto himself. Over the course of his thirty-year career, Ibn Khaldun shifted
his allegiances frequently and moved from one court to another with little or no regard for the
particular ruler or his policies.39 He served primarily in the capacity of vizier—a close political
advisor—to various rulers and princes of the Marinid, Hafsid, Zayyanid and Granadan emirates.
Twice he was imprisoned for allegedly (and likely) conspiring to overthrow his patrons; twice he
barely avoided execution. Every new position brought new intrigues, new political maneuvers,
and, most importantly, new opportunities to study the dynamics of human social interaction and
the inner mechanics of inter- and intrastate politics.40 In a comparative perspective, Ibn
Khaldun’s political career is in many ways reminiscent of Niccolo Machiavelli’s over a century
later.41

The Muqaddimah and Ibn Khaldun’s Historical Method

Combined with his thorough understandings of Classical and Islamic history, Ibn
Khaldun’s direct involvement within the fractious sphere of North African and Andalusian
politics provided him with the data necessary to begin synthesizing and documenting his
37
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experiences. Like Machiavelli after him, he hoped to use the knowledge accrued over a thirtyyear career to discern general principles of history, society, and politics as a means of providing
lessons and offering advice to contemporary and future political leaders.42
In order to accomplish this task, Ibn Khaldun intended to explain the steady political
dissolution of Islamic North Africa and Spain well under way in his time. He wanted to
understand how the Islamic peoples43—more specifically, the Islamic political associations—of
the Maghreb had disintegrated so completely over the course of several hundred years. Why
were the North African states so unstable? Why were attempts at unification so few and, when
attempted, so catastrophic?44
These locally concerned questions naturally led Ibn Khaldun towards the meta-historical,
structural, and philosophical: what is the nature of history? Why and how do empires rise and
fall? What is politics and the purpose of government? What is the mobilizing force in a given
society? How are civilizations built? Like the early-modern Western political philosophers and
historians who would follow him, Ibn Khaldun found himself confronting questions that dealt
with the essence of human nature, social organization, and social change.45
To begin this ambitious task, Ibn Khaldun first required some semblance of peace and
solitude that his political occupation and reputation had denied him throughout his career. He
paradoxically found that peace while on the run from the Zayyanid emir, Abu Hammu II, in
1375. For four years, Ibn Khaldun and his family were housed and protected by the “fiercely
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independent” Awlad ‘Arif tribe in their fortress, the Qal’at Ibn Salama.46 It was during this brief
exile from Maghrebi politics that Ibn Khaldun began writing his Muqaddimah, or “introduction,”
to what would become his Kitab al-‘Ibar, the Book of Lessons.47
In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun intended to establish new theories and methods of
examining and explaining history, society, and politics. His purpose in doing so was to ground
and contextualize his subsequent voluminous histories of the Arabs, Berbers, Persians, and
Turks,48 while simultaneously distancing himself from the established methods of historical
research. In spite of his extensive training in Islamic jurisprudence and scholarship, Ibn Khaldun
found two aspects of history to be intertwined: that to “understand the causes and nature of
historical events, one must start from correct information; but in order to be able to rectify
information about events and distinguish the correct from the false, one must know their nature
and causes.”49 Thus, as Lenn Goodman argues, we find in Ibn Khaldun a demand for clarity,
realism, and critical thinking in opposition to the “naïveté or fausse naïveté of traditional and
sacred history.”50 Ibn Khaldun therefore eschewed traditional methods of historical research and
interpretation.
Much like the judges and scholars within the four recognized ‘schools’ (madahib) of
Islamic jurisprudence, medieval Islamic historians relied overwhelmingly on the method of
personality criticism in determining the veracity of historical accounts through their chains of
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oral transmitters (isnad).51 While Ibn Khaldun found this method suitable for Hadith scholarship,
he thought it intellectually lacking and prone to distortion when applied to factual historical
research. Reliance on transmitters and personality criticism, he argued, fails on several levels:

1. The method fails to account for qualitative and quantitative anomalies in “accepted”
transmissions that defy logic, critical thought, or knowledge of “the nature of events and
the circumstances and requirements in the world of existence.”52 Ibn Khaldun gives
several examples of such problems, one being a story related by al-Masudi describing a
city in the Western Sahara built entirely of copper. The story, according to Ibn Khaldun,
is factually absurd, because the details “contradict the natural facts that apply to the
building and planning of cities.”53 The task of the historian, therefore, is to “investigate
whether it is possible that the (reported facts) could have happened. This is more
important than, and has priority over, personality criticism.”54

2. The method does not account for the changes that naturally occur within societies over
time, a “hidden pitfall” Ibn Khaldun finds especially problematic when scholars attempt
to interpret history for contemporary application. He writes, “The condition of the world
and of nations, their customs and sects, does not persist in the same form or in a constant
manner. There are differences according to days and periods, and changes from one
condition to another. Such is the case with individuals, times, and cities, and it likewise
happens in connection with regions and districts, periods and dynasties.”55 He therefore
finds it unconscionable to seek, as some of his contemporary religious scholars did, to
recreate the exact conditions of the time of the Prophet based upon oral history.56
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Considering these problems with the extant methods of historical investigation, Ibn
Khaldun argued in the opening of the Muqaddimah that for history to have any bearing on
contemporary life—if people wished to comprehend the true lessons history teaches—the
methods of historical inquiry and understanding had to change. A qualitative shift had to be
made away from rote memorization of events, oral history, and personality criticism of their
transmitters towards a method that took a critical stand on historical inquiry, employed reason in
its examination of “facts,” and sought to discern the underlying realities or “essences” of events,
cultures, and civilizations. To this end, he wrote:

The normative method for distinguishing right from wrong in historical information on the
grounds of inherent possibility or absurdity is to investigate human social organization, which is
identical to civilization. We must distinguish the conditions that attach themselves to the essence
of civilization as required by its very nature; the things that are accidental and cannot be counted
on; and the things that cannot possibly attach themselves to it…Such is the purpose of this first
book of our work. (The subject) is in a way an independent science with its own peculiar object—
that is, human civilization and social organization.57

Developing this “science of culture,” as Mahdi58 labels it, became Ibn Khaldun’s sole project
while he and his family remained at the Qal’at Ibn Salama.59 It took him two years to complete
the first draft of the Muqaddimah’s first two volumes, which contain the bulk of this new
science. The remainder of the project, including his Kitab al-‘Ibar, kept him occupied for the rest
of his life, which he spent serving as the Maliki Grand Qadi (judge) of Mamluk Egypt.60
Turning, then, to Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, we will spend the following three chapters
engaging the foundational assumptions that ground his political philosophy and science of
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culture—namely, his understanding of human nature, his concept of ‘asabiyya (social cohesion),
and his theory of state collapse.
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CHAPTER THREE: HUMAN NATURE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE BIRTH OF
CIVILIZATION

All theories of politics and governance base their conclusions on, and derive their
prescriptions from, implicit or explicit assumptions and observations about human nature. Ibn
Khaldun’s theories are no different. However, unlike many of his contemporaries 61 in the
Western political tradition, his conception of a human’s “natural disposition” is neither uniform
nor universal.62 Moreover, it is neither static nor essentially intrinsic. Instead, Ibn Khaldun offers
a vision of human nature that is highly nuanced, layered, and all but impossible to neatly
categorize.
For Ibn Khaldun, human nature is a deeply complicated force, at one and the same time
intrinsically molded by God’s will and extrinsically shaped by environment and custom. In the
first case, Ibn Khaldun makes clear that God grants all people the natural capacity for reason, but
helps or hinders that capacity according to His will—he cites the Qur’anic verse, “God guides
with His light whom He will,”63 as evidence. In addition to the intrinsic machinations of God,
Ibn Khaldun argues that environment and custom play the largest roles in shaping a population’s
“natural disposition.” He writes,
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The soul in its first natural state of creation is ready to accept whatever good or evil may arrive
and leave an imprint upon it. Muhammad said: ‘Every infant is born in the natural state. It is his
parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a heathen.’64

In his third and fourth prefatory discussions of human civilization, for example, Ibn
Khaldun asserts that the natural dispositions and temperaments (as well as the skin colors) of
people are, in many ways, forged by their regional climates. He suggests that a people’s
“condition” moves along a spectrum between extremity and temperance relative to its climatic
setting.65 Hence, he argues the peoples of the three central zones (including Western Europe, the
Maghreb, and China, among others) are the most temperate in body, spirit, and “natural
disposition”; whereas, the peoples of the outer zones to the north and south (he specifically
mentions sub-Saharan Africans) are prone to the extremes of emotion, have little capacity for
rational action, and are practically incapable of reasoned, “temperate” thought. 66
While the oversimplified generalizations of these observations offer little insight into Ibn
Khaldun’s political thought per se, they do emphasize the fluidity of his ideas concerning human
nature. Being an environmental-material argument only, there is nothing to suggest that a given
population could not change their “natural dispositions” over time by migrating from an
“extreme” end of the spectrum towards the “temperate” center. This fluidity is further discussed
at length in Ibn Khaldun’s treatment of Bedouin nomads, which we will come back to later, and
underscores the importance of “custom and habit” in his understanding of human nature.
For Ibn Khaldun, “custom” is the principal force by which human nature changes over
time. As he argues, “Man is a child of the customs and things he has become used to. He is not
the product of his natural disposition and temperament.”67 Instead, changes in habit necessitate
64
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changes in temperament. This position generates important implications for Ibn Khaldun’s
theory of political organization. Notably, it imbues his thought with skeptical—even
pessimistic—conservatism. This aspect of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas then begs the question, how do
the evolving kinds of human nature affect the construction of sovereignty and political
organizations? An initial comparison between Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides68 is both useful and
instructive when considering this question.
Like Ibn Khaldun, Thucydides’ understanding of human nature informs his
understanding of social action, interaction, and disintegration. Furthermore, Thucydides argues,
like Ibn Khaldun, that the inherent qualities of human kind necessarily affect and direct the
formation, consolidation, ascension, and destruction of “states.” This somewhat deterministic69
position is not surprising when one considers both the historical, political, and social milieus in
which both authors lived and wrote. Each played seminal roles in the politics of their “states,”
each watched with horrified fascination as their respective societies steadily collapsed, and each
was well placed (in exile) to reflect at length on the historical forces that caused and propelled
the collapse.
Thucydides, a one-time Athenian general, has a generally pessimistic—indeed, tragic—
view of human nature, but his pessimism is qualified. While both individual and collective fear,
honor, and interest play the dominant roles in determining the course of human action70,
Thucydides recognizes that for every ambitious demagogue like Cleon71 and every self-
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interested traitor like Alcibiades72 there are honest, honorable, and loyal citizens like Pericles73
and Brasidas.74 However, for Thucydides, such people are the exceptions that prove the rule, and
throughout The Peloponnesian War, he repeatedly asserts the primacy of blind ambition, selfinterest, and greed in animating society and driving it towards war and eventual destruction.75
This dualistic tension in Thucydides’ characterization of human nature is likewise found
in Ibn Khaldun. Throughout the Muqaddimah, we observe in Ibn Khaldun’s thought something
of an internal conflict over the basic qualities of human “temperament.” In many ways, this
dualism is a reflection of the conflict between an Islamic view of human nature and one based
solely upon observational experience and reasoned deduction.
On one hand, for example, Ibn Khaldun asserts that (all things being equal) people are
inherently inclined towards justice and goodness. These inherent qualities exist, first and
foremost, because God formed humankind thus.76 In addition, Ibn Khaldun adds, humankind’s
capacity for reason and logic is able to override the base animalistic traits of aggression and
lust—even more so when buttressed by religion—thereby orienting human nature towards
good.77 On the other hand, he suggests that evil is, more often than not, the primary character of
the human condition, writing:

Evil is the quality that is closest to man when he fails to improve his customs and when religion is
not used as the model to improve him. The great mass of mankind is in that condition…Evil
qualities in man are injustice and mutual aggression. He who casts his eye upon the property of his
brother will lay his hand upon it to take it, unless there is a restraining influence to hold him
back.78
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This internal conflict brings us to Ibn Khaldun’s conception of social construction and political
development, which is itself somewhat conflicted. Whereas the political thinkers of earlymodern Europe base their theories of politics upon unchanging universal ideal typologies of
human nature and “Natural Law,” Ibn Khaldun fuses human nature and human necessity with a
telos of power particular to time and place.
In the first place, Ibn Khaldun argues that people need each other to survive and prosper.
In his development of the theory, there is strong evidence of what we might call “thick”
sociability.79 That is, Ibn Khaldun stresses the fact that humans build communities not simply out
of self-interested self-preservation, but because they are naturally communal, cooperative, and
sociable creatures. He writes,

human beings have to dwell in common and settle together in cities and hamlets for the comforts
of companionship and for the satisfaction of human needs, as a result of the natural disposition of
human beings towards co-operation in order to be able to make a living. 80

Furthermore, he cites Aristotle claiming, “Man is ‘political’ by nature,” and can therefore not
exist without “social organization” in the form of the “town or ‘polis’.”81
An interesting echo of this inherent need for social cooperation is found in Samuel
Pufendorf’s concept of “that mutual Help Men afford one another,” which alone accounts for the
advantages of organized human society.82 One could also look to John Locke for a similar
conception of human sociability, where, in his Second Treatise on Government, he famously
writes,
79
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Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully [sic], so by the
like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.83

An additional echo of this thick sociability can be found in Locke’s discussion of mutual
assistance and association for the protection of property rights. Like Locke, Ibn Khaldun makes
implicit assumptions about human nature when discussing property rights, protecting those
rights, and the role government plays in the process. Locke, for example, argues that the “chief
end” of the social contract, leading people out of the “state of nature” into a commonwealth
under government, is the desire to protect individual property under the rule of law. 84 That
people have the reason, desire, and trust to do so with one another highlights Locke’s more
favorable and/or optimistic view of human nature. Ibn Khaldun, arguing from an alternate
perspective, likewise asserts the trusting, cooperative nature of people in entrusting “their
property and their lives to the governor or ruler who rules them.”85
This is not to say that Ibn Khaldun neglects or diminishes the basic human need for selfpreservation and defense.86 Indeed, there is an equally strong instrumentalism in his portrayal of
society. He goes to great lengths, for example, to enumerate the various physical disadvantages
of defense that make human monadic life all but impossible, and therefore asserts, “Human
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social organization is something necessary;”87 for, otherwise, “the human species would
vanish.”88
Politics arises out of this necessary organization, which Ibn Khaldun defines as being
“concerned with the administration of home or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical
requirements, for the purpose of directing the mass toward a behaviour [sic] that will result in the
preservation and permanence of the species.”89 For Ibn Khaldun, the preferred—indeed,
necessary—method of this preservation is undisputed, autocratic royal authority.
Ibn Khaldun begins his discussion of political sovereignty with a simple premise: “Not
everyone is master of his own affairs…As a rule, man must by necessity be dominated by
someone else.”90 There are rulers and there are the ruled. Moreover, people need rulers;
civilization requires them. This requirement is borne out of the need for an authority to repress
the base tendencies of humanity as a means of keeping the peace and ensuring social stability. As
Ibn Khaldun elaborates,

People need someone to exercise a restraining influence and keep them apart, for aggressiveness
and injustice are in the animal nature of man…The person who exercises a restraining
influence…must dominate them and have power and authority over them, so that no one of them
will be able to attack another. This is the meaning of royal authority. 91

To any student of Western political theory, this argument will sound strikingly familiar. It is
therefore useful, in order to further our understanding of Ibn Khaldun’s theory of sovereignty, to
consider it in juxtaposition to that of Thomas Hobbes.

87

Ibid.
Muqaddimah, I 1, p. 46.
89
Muqaddimah, Introduction, p. 39.
90
Muqaddimah, II 6, p. 95.
91
Muqaddimah, I 1, p. 47.
88

29

In Leviathan92, Hobbes asserts the need for a “common power,” apart from and above the
masses, to keep the people “in awe,” i.e. pacified and obedient.93 This need stems from Hobbes’
understanding of human action as being more inclined towards self-interested and competitive
individualism than communal altruism or cooperation. The endemic conflicts among people in a
“state of nature” that Hobbes deems unavoidable arise because no one person can ever truly be
secure until he or she perceives no threat to his or her life. 94 Reaching such an ideal state
engenders a constant power struggle, or war of all against all. 95 To break this cycle of violence, a
unitary and absolute sovereign must somehow contractually emerge in order to shepherd the
masses and prevent a regression and collapse back into anarchy.
Much like Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides, Hobbes’ ideas are deeply rooted in and
influenced by his time, place, sociopolitical and intellectual contexts. Writing in the wake of the
Thirty Years War and in the midst of the English Civil War, Hobbes bore witness to the crippling
effects domestic and international anarchy had on the social fabric of the European state.96
Furthermore, as the first person to translate Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War into
English, the lessons Hobbes drew from the ancient historian on democracy, war, diplomacy, and
human nature resonated deeply when he sought to make sense of the chaos engulfing England.97
Leviathan, published in 1651, therefore emerged as Hobbes’ response to the
philosophical and political incoherence he saw around him. First, Leviathan represented a
critique of liberal natural law and natural rights philosophy—notably that espoused by Hugo
Grotius. To Hobbes, Grotius’ vision of human sociability as naturally “peaceful and organized”
92
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and his following conclusion that such inherent sociability establishes “objective moral
principles” in the form of natural rights was severely misguided.98 Given his high regard for
Thucydides and firsthand experience with dynastic overthrow, civil war, and political exile, it is
little wonder Hobbes had neither time nor tolerance for Grotius’ neo-Ciceronian views of human
nature, natural law, natural rights, or “laws” of nations. Leviathan therefore served as Hobbes’
rebuttal to the Grotian project.
Second, like Ibn Khaldun, Hobbes turned his otherwise philosophical writing into social
commentary with practical political lessons. By identifying the chief problem afflicting mid-17th
century England (political anarchy, civil war), explaining its most salient causes (dysfunctional
liberal parliamentarianism, unchecked human nature), and providing its ultimate solution
(coercive absolutism), Hobbes sought to influence future English rulers and lawmakers, whether
Parliamentarian or Monarchist.
Like Thucydides and Hobbes, Ibn Khaldun is deeply suspicious of liberalizing trends in
politics.99 Ibn Khaldun’s construction of sovereignty as a means of internal conflict prevention
therefore appears in many ways similar to the view of Hobbes. Consider, for example, Ibn
Khaldun’s assertion that, “By the dint of their nature, human beings need someone to act as a
restraining influence and mediator in every social organization, in order to keep its members
from fighting with each other.”100 The need arises out of a natural acquisitiveness Ibn Khaldun,
like Hobbes, sees in humanity: people naturally seek power—political and material—over
others. A coercive authority is therefore required to squelch the more pernicious effects of
unchecked human greed. Ibn Khaldun writes, “Evil qualities in man are injustice and mutual
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aggression. He who casts his eye upon the property of his brother will lay his hand upon it to
take it, unless there is a restraining influence to hold him back.” 101 That influence is
“governmental authority.”102
Moreover, Ibn Khaldun finds that politics, in addition to human nature, “requires that
only one person exercise control,” because “were various persons, liable to differ among each
other, to exercise it, destruction of the whole could result.”103 Indeed, a recurring theme
throughout the Muqaddimah is the need to maintain intrastate order against the prospect of
internal anarchy. In the context of 14th century North Africa—as in 17th century England—
unitary “royal authority” represents the best choice.
Of further interest is the method by which both Ibn Khaldun and Hobbes arrive at their
political prescriptions. Hobbes, like all the notable social contract theorists of early-modern
Europe, places his theoretical human subjects in a “state of nature,” which exists a priori to civic
society/commonwealth/civilization. Contrary to popular interpretation, however, Hobbes does
not consider this natural state merely a heuristic device; he offers (like John Locke after him 104)
the example of Native Americans as, in fact, living in such a state.105
Likewise, Ibn Khaldun uses the example of Bedouin nomadic tribes to represent a case
study of people living in a state prior to civilized, sedentary society. According to Ibn Khaldun,
the Bedouin are “the most savage human beings that exist.”106 They are hardy, toughened by
their environment, and prone to violence with other groups of people. They always carry
weapons, seldom rest in the open, and are untrusting of people outside the familial clan. They
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have no government or established political order, depending instead upon the leadership of the
strongest man in the group.107 However, what little social structure there is in Bedouin groups
cannot make up for the overall instability of their existence. As Ibn Khaldun explains,

A nation dominated by the Bedouins is in a state no different from anarchy, where everybody is
set against the others. Such a civilization cannot last and goes quickly to ruin, as would be the case
in a state of anarchy.108

Ibn Khaldun makes clear, however, that Bedouins, like the Hobbesian state-of-nature
population, actively aspire to sedentary civilization. They find nothing noble in their savagery
and seek the means to escape their hardship. In doing so, Ibn Khaldun recognizes a singular
quality endemic not only to the Bedouin, but to all groups of people who actively work to secure
social and political change. He calls it ‘asabiyya, and it is the subject to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ‘ASABIYYA AND THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
In Theory
Ibn Khaldun’s greatest contribution to the study of politics—indeed, of human social
action generally—is his concept of ‘asabiyya. For Ibn Khaldun, ‘asabiyya represents the
principal driving force behind all collective, “civilizing” social activity. More than simply an
explanatory heuristic device, Ibn Khaldun describes ‘asabiyya as simultaneously a shared human
bond, an identifying social construct, and a force unto itself; it is a blind will to power and
impetus for conscientious right action, a mobilizing process and, in the end, its own telos. It is, as
Lenn Goodman argues, the substrate of political change and the engine of history.109 However,
before engaging in a lengthy hermeneutical discussion of ‘asabiyya and its application to
contemporary political theory, we must first deal with how both the word and the idea are and
have been defined in translation by modern scholars.
The word, ‘asabiyya, has its roots in pre-Islamic Arab tribal societies, where it was used
to signify unity in “thought and action, and social and economic cohesiveness among members
of the same tribe.”110 The word’s root, ‘asaba, means “kin” or “blood relation,” and is also
related to the words isaba and usba, both meaning “group.”111 As simply a word, then, ‘asabiyya
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already had deeply familial and tribal connotations among Arabs before Ibn Khaldun
appropriated it for his use. Upon doing so, Ibn Khaldun added multiple layers of theoretical
complexity to word, thereby making it extremely difficult to translate adequately—particularly
into English.
Franz Rosenthal, the first (and, thus far, only) scholar to translate the entire Muqaddimah
into English, interprets ‘asabiyya in a simultaneously vague and unsatisfying manner, rendering
it as “group feeling.”112 Being the first full English translation of the Muqaddimah—by itself a
momentous accomplishment—it seems perhaps too much in hindsight to have expected
Rosenthal to produce the definitive interpretation of ‘asabiyya. Nevertheless, “group feeling”
leaves much to be desired.113 The phrase captures little of the concept’s deeply embedded
sociopolitical characteristics and therefore lacks sufficient strength.
Ernest Gellner takes a different approach to the interpretation of ‘asabiyya, and tries to
link it to Durkheim’s theory of organic and mechanical solidarities. 114 Perhaps reading too much
of Durkheim’s thought into ‘asabiyya, Gellner labels it “social solidarity,” although the
translation by itself connotes a stronger sense of group unity in thought and action than
Rosenthal’s. Allen J. Fromhertz similarly links ‘asabiyya to the Durkheimian concepts of
solidarity, translating the term as “tribal solidarity.”115 Eschewing any potential association with
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Durkheimian language, Akbar S. Ahmed uses “social cohesion” as the translation of choice.116
Still, neither “solidarity” nor “cohesion” truly get at the multiple meanings Ibn Khaldun packs
into ‘asabiyya.
These four brief examples illustrate the relative inadequacy of the English language when
trying to encapsulate the historical-contextual meanings of ‘asabiyya in translation. Ultimately,
what matters most is not the translation, but the interpretation and definition. We should
therefore find it more useful for our purposes to leave Ibn Khaldun’s term in the original Arabic
transliteration, and concern ourselves instead with unpacking its multiple layers of meaning.
First, we must establish the constituent characteristics of ‘asabiyya. What exactly is it?
What isn’t it? Are there extant works of Western political and social theory to which it can be
usefully compared? Mohammed Talbi provides a compelling point of departure, arguing that
‘asabiyya is “at one and the same time the cohesive force of the group, the conscience that it has
of its own specificity and collective aspirations, and the tension that animates it and impels it
ineluctably to seek power through conquest.”117
Talbi states first that ‘asabiyya is the cohesive force of the group, the bond needed to
sustain and propel the group toward its goal. In this narrow sense, ‘asabiyya does somewhat
resemble the mechanical solidarity of Durkheim. That is, it acts as the singular social norm/value
upon which all group members agree; it represents the “strong, well-defined [state] of collective
consciousness” that binds them to each other.118 Ibn Khaldun claims this bond is strongest
among blood relations, but, importantly, is not restricted thereto. In his view, “clients and allies”
also share in a group’s ‘asabiyya. He writes, “[‘Asabiyya] results only from blood relationship or
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something corresponding to it.”119 That last phrase is significant, particularly when examining
Ibn Khaldun’s relevance to the study of 21st century world politics. For, in the context of the
modern world, we can see ‘asabiyya as an object of collective identification to which people
willingly subordinate their personal interests and, when necessary, their lives.120
This voluntary individual subordination to a collective interest highlights Talbi’s second
characteristic of ‘asabiyya. He argues that ‘asabiyya is the conscience the group has of its
uniqueness and its collective aspirations. Such a consciousness evokes a corporeal image of
‘asabiyya—of something more than a group qua group of individuals, but of a single self with its
own interests, kinetic force, and telos. In this specific regard, it is not unlike Rousseau’s General
Will. Consider, for example, Ibn Khaldun’s argument that ‘asabiyya “gives protection and makes
possible mutual defense, the pressing of claims, and every other kind of social activity,” 121 that it
represents “one common accord,”122 juxtaposed to Rousseau’s characterization of the General
Will in his Social Contract:

As long as a certain number of men consider themselves to be a single body, they have but one will,
which relates to the common security and to the general welfare. In such case all the forces of the
State are vigorous and simple, and its principles are clear and luminous; it has no confused and
conflicting interests.123

Rousseau, like Ibn Khaldun, also stresses the societal significance of his theoretical construct,
arguing that political stability depends entirely on strict adherence to the General Will:

But when the social bond begins to fail and the State is weakened, when private interests begin to
make themselves felt and small factions to exercise influence on the State, the common interest is
119
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harmed and finds opponents; unanimity no longer reigns in the voting; the general will is no
longer the will of all.124

Furthermore, both Ibn Khaldun and Rousseau emphasize the monism of their constructs. There
can be only one ruling ‘asabiyya, only one governing General Will.125 In this sense, ‘asabiyya
assumes a competitive force and naturally intrinsic will to power. As there can be but one
superior ‘asabiyya, a struggle between or among competing ‘asabiyyas is inevitable and will end
only when the strongest has subordinated the rest to its will.126
While Rousseau’s characterization of the General Will speaks to the political attributes
and aspirations of ‘asabiyya, it misses the broader social and moral forces endemic to its nature.
For such considerations, a very useful comparison can be made between ‘asabiyya and two
oppositional aspects of Hegel’s conception of social Geist. As Hegel explicates in
Phenomenology of Sprit, Geist (spirit) develops dialectically at varying social levels—from the
personal micro, but more importantly, to the social and universal macro—and changes over time
through the reconciliation of dichotomous understandings of the world and their correspondingly
antithetical truth claims.127
Considering Hegel’s evolutionary, emergent model of human consciousness, we can
juxtapose ‘asabiyya to Geist by looking at the internal conflict embedded in Hegel’s conception
of Geist-as-Ethical Consciousness and action. Much like Ibn Khaldun, Hegel argues that the
Ethical Consciousness of Geist sublimates individualistic particularisms and familial
relationships within a society or polity, binding it together with a shared veneration for
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“Truth”128 as realized in “Law”129 and providing it with a distinct identity. For Hegel, this
“ethical substance” represents a “schismless orientation toward law,”130 providing society’s Geist
both a moral compass and a defined enemy: the “other.”
The “other” can be either internal or external and is recognized by its alternative,
antithetical truth claims. According to Hegel, the Ethical Consciousness orients itself either to
“divine law” or “human law,”131 and it is this difference that breeds tension and conflict among
the ethically conscious. Like ‘asabiyya, Ethical Consciousness is competitively monistic and
cannot tolerate pluralism: society’s Geist is either oriented towards the divine or the human, in
which case the alternate “other” must be subdued and eliminated. Hegel writes:

The ethical, being absolute power as well as absolute essence, can tolerate no subversion of its
content. If it were just absolute essence without power, it could experience a subversion through
individuality; but individuality as ethical consciousness has renounced subversion, in conjunction
with its surrender of one-sided existence-for-self. And conversely, power bereft [of essence], if it
were still this sort of one-sided existence-for-self, could be subverted by the essence. 132

In this passage, Hegel not only highlights the dichotomization of divine and human law, but
makes clear the individual’s sublimation of his or her “one-sided existence-for-self” to the
greater Ethical Consciousness of society. Like ‘asabiyya, Ethical Consciousness of the social
Geist requires total fealty and unwavering support towards the advance and defense of the Law’s
goals.133 It thereby animates the populace forward in its conflict with the “other.”
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Thus, we approach Talbi’s third characterization of ‘asabiyya: that it is, itself, the
dialectic tension animating and propelling the group to seek power through conquest. Of this
fact, Ibn Khaldun leaves no doubt. Throughout the Muqaddimah he repeatedly describes the one
goal of ‘asabiyya as “royal authority.”134 By royal authority, Ibn Khaldun means social and
political hegemony. He argues that the competitive dynamism inherent in the collective
conscience of the group necessitates, instigates, and sustains the drive for political ascendancy.
Being the substrate of political change—change predicated upon the relative strength of the
group—‘asabiyya is therefore naturally compelled to seek power. It is not the stuff of mere
activists, but of revolutionaries.
Having established what ‘asabiyya is, we must now explain its mechanics: how it comes
into being, grows, and succeeds through conquest. As noted earlier, Ibn Khaldun understands
‘asabiyya as originating among blood relations and extended family units, namely, the clan or
tribe.135 From the familial unit, ‘asabiyya may expand over time to include others; for, as Ibn
Khaldun writes, “If the direct relationship between persons who help each other is very close, so
that it leads to close contact and unity, the ties are obvious and clearly require the (existence of a
feeling of solidarity) [sic].”136 Among those he sees sharing in a dominant group’s ‘asabiyya are
family servants, personal friends, political allies, and any who share the mutual interests of the
group.137
Beyond the scope of this circle, Ibn Khaldun argues that the infusion of religion with the
group’s ‘asabiyya acts as a means of increasing not only the group’s numerical strength, but the
level of its prestige and legitimacy of its claims as well. Writing in the context of medieval Islam
134
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and the history of the Muslim conquests, Ibn Khaldun understands that religion plays an
enormous role as a unifying force and catalyst for change. He therefore argues that religiously
infused ‘asabiyya is substantially stronger than kinship-based ‘asabiyya alone.
Drawing upon the Christo-Islamic traditions of martyrdom, Ibn Khaldun explains how
religion inspires a “concentration on the truth” among group members and eliminates their fear
of death. Instead, members become willing to die for the group.138 This willingness of selfsacrifice trumps any numerical advantage the group’s opposition may have. Furthermore, it
legitimizes the group’s claim-making abilities and inspires others outside the group to join or
support it.139 Thus, the group builds strength and momentum.140 Ibn Khaldun writes:

Dynasties of wide power and [great] royal authority have their origin in religion based on
prophethood or on truthful [messages 141]. This is because royal authority results only from
superiority. Superiority results from [‘asabiyya]. Only by God’s help in establishing His religion
do individual desires come together in agreement to press their claims, and hearts become united.
The secret of this is that when hearts succumb to false desires and are inclined toward the world,
mutual jealousy and widespread differences arise. When they are turned toward the truth and
reject the world and whatever is false, and advance toward God, they become one in their outlook.
Jealousy disappears. Mutual co-operation and support flourish. As a result, the extent of the state
widens, and the dynasty grows.142

Given this understanding, it can be argued that religion is the cohesive force of a group’s
‘asabiyya—the ideational/emotional glue of the social glue, as it were.143 That is, while kinship,
friendship, and mutual interest may bind a group together and animate it towards sociopolitical
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gain (royal authority), only religion can serve as the supra-human substrate that eliminates
potentially divisive and destructive elements of contention among members. Moreover, it is
religion—more than any other human/material incentive—that causes a group’s ranks to swell.144
Regardless of the group’s numerical strength and popular legitimacy, however, Ibn
Khaldun stresses that unless the group’s ‘asabiyya is stronger than that of its opponents, it will
not succeed. How then does one tell if a given group’s ‘asabiyya is stronger or weaker than that
of its opponents? Ibn Khaldun gives us three externally dependent variables upon which to base
our calculations:

(1)

Religion: As noted above, the relative religiosity of a group plays a substantial
role in unifying the group, giving it divine guidance and inspiration, legitimizing
its claims to power, and generating additional strength through conversions. A
group whose ‘asabiyya is based purely on political or material grounds is
considerably weaker than one bolstered by religious fervor and guidance.

(2)

Homogeneity: Ibn Khaldun argues that a given ‘asabiyya will be successful in
overthrowing an entrenched political order and establishing firm, lasting royal
authority (read: state) only in relatively homogenous territories. He states that the
social and political differences inherent in heterogeneous societies indicate the
presence of numerous oppositional ‘asabiyyas; therefore, “at any time…there is
much opposition to a dynasty and rebellion against it, even if the dynasty
possesses [‘asabiyya], because each [‘asabiyya] under the control of the ruling
dynasty thinks that it has in itself enough strength and power.”145 Hence, an
insurgent ‘asabiyya will be successful in establishing lasting royal authority only
within largely homogenous territories.
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(3)

Stage of Oppositional ‘Asabiyya: This last variable, to be discussed in greater
detail in the next chapter, greatly influences the chances a group has in achieving
its rise to power. Briefly, Ibn Khaldun compares the vitality of the state to that of
a human being, suggesting that any given political order goes through successive
stages of birth, growth, adulthood, senility and death.146 The younger the order,
the stronger its ‘asabiyya; therefore, the timing of a challenge to the order’s
authority helps determine the challenger’s chances of success.

Given these variables, we can surmise that a group whose ‘asabiyya is (1) infused with religious
zeal, (2) based in a largely homogenous society, and (3) targeted against an older, “senile”
regime has excellent prospects of realizing its political goals and overthrowing the established
political order. However, Ibn Khaldun does not end his discussion of ‘asabiyya on such a
positive note. Instead, he asserts the realization of ‘asabiyya must simultaneously sow the seeds
of its future collapse. The implications of these contentions carry enormous weight relative to the
study of contemporary global political movements. Still, the question remains: while Ibn
Khaldun’s theoretical understanding and construction of ‘asabiyya may appear intriguing, even
convincing, in the abstract, how does he see ‘asabiyya operating in reality? Are there concrete
examples to which he points?

In Practice
Ibn Khaldun presents numerous evidentiary ‘case studies’ throughout the Muqaddimah to
illuminate ‘asabiyya’s foundational role in human history. Of these, one stands out in particular:
the history of the Arab Muslim conquests. Ibn Khaldun uses the history he is most intimately
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familiar with to prove the case that ‘asabiyya is the genuine engine of history.147 Throughout his
thematic discussions of the rise and fall of states, Ibn Khaldun repeatedly returns to the Arab
Muslim conquests as examples of ‘asabiyya in action.
He first notes the condition of the Arab tribes before the arrival and spread of Islam,
calling them “the most savage human beings” that existed.148 He claims this savagery came
about thanks to the early Arabs’ desert nomadism and tribalism. In turn, the physical hardship
and social brutality of their lives forged internally close-knit and externally aggressive
communities based on blood kinship. To Ibn Khaldun, the pre-Islamic Arabs embodied both the
most primitive and most feared form of ‘asabiyya.149 Only after the arrival of Muhammad’s
revelation and the infusion of “the religious law,” he argues, did the Arab’s ‘asabiyya coalesce
into a civilizing force capable of urbanizing, expanding through conquest, and, more importantly,
governing an empire.150
Hence, Ibn Khaldun asserts that the adoption of religion paves the way for ‘asabiyya’s
ascension. Only through religion or a “turn towards the truth,” he argues, can internal disputes
and jealousies be replaced by “mutual co-operation and support,” thereby creating the social
unanimity necessary for conquest.151 It is therefore self-evident to Ibn Khaldun why Arab
Muslim expansion occurred so rapidly and so successfully: the Arabs’ ‘asabiyya was stronger in
its nomadism, more violent in its tribalism, and legitimized in its “service of good,” 152 i.e. Islam.
In Ibn Khaldun’s view, opposing dynasties stood little chance—even against (initially)
numerically weaker Arab armies—because of the strength of Arab Muslim ‘asabiyya. He writes:
147
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Therefore, they [opposing states] do not offer resistance to (the people with religious [zeal]), even
if they themselves are more numerous. They are overpowered by them and quickly wiped
out…This happened to the Arabs at the beginning of Islam during the Muslim conquests. The
armies of the Muslims at al-Qadisiyah and at the Yarmuk numbered some 30,000 in each case,
while the Persian troops at al-Qadisiyah numbered 120,000, and the troops of Heraclius, according
to al-Waqidi, 400,000. Neither of the two parties was able to withstand the Arabs, who routed
them and seized what they possessed. 153

Here we see ‘asabiyya in its purest form: on the move, in permanent conflict.154
Moreover, Ibn Khaldun argues that the initial strength of Arab ‘asabiyya accounted for the extent
and might of the early Islamic empires. He argues, first, “Religion cemented their leadership
with the religious law and its ordinances, which, explicitly and implicitly, are concerned with
what is good for civilization…As a result, the royal authority and government of the Arabs
became great and strong.”155 Second, he notes how the power of Islam both legitimized the Arab
conquerors and drew numerous societies into their ranks, writing:

The expansion and power of a dynasty correspond to the numerical strength of those who obtain
superiority at the beginning of the rule. The length of its duration also depends on it…If the
[‘asabiyya] is strong, the (dynasty’s) temper likewise is strong, and its life of long duration…This
may be observed in the Arab Muslim dynasty. It lasted the longest of (all Muslim) dynasties,
counting both the ‘Abbasids in the centre and the Umayyads far away in Spain. Their rule
collapsed only after the fourth [tenth] century.156

Through Ibn Khaldun’s example of the Arab Muslim conquests, we see the mechanics of
‘asabiyya at work. However, this is only half of the picture. For, as Ibn Khaldun makes clear, the
political ascension of ‘asabiyya directly corresponds to the moment it begins to decay.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE INEXORABLE DECAY OF ‘ASABIYYA AND STATE
COLLAPSE

Ibn Khaldun develops an intricate relationship between ‘asabiyya and royal, or what we
might call ‘state,’ authority. As has already been established, he endows ‘asabiyya with an
intrinsic and immutable will to power. All things being equal, this will is strongest when bereft
and in pursuit of political power. Here we see Ibn Khaldun’s metaphorical allusion to the
strength of Bedouin nomadism157, for ‘asabiyya is most potent when in constant motion. When
that motion towards power ends following the group’s political ascension, ‘asabiyya loses its
telos, becomes sedentary, and slowly but steadily begins to decay. 158 The moment ‘asabiyya
becomes sedentary necessarily corresponds to the founding moment of authority vested in the
state. In this moment, ‘asabiyya is both fulfilled and irrevocably set upon the path to extinction.
So, too, is the state.159
Here again we find an interesting comparative correspondence with Hegel. In his
dialectic of Ethical Substance, Hegel posits that the struggle between the divine and human
orientations toward Law necessarily ends in the destruction of both—even when one side
“defeats” the other—and the emergence of a new, distinct form:

The victory of one of the powers and its corresponding character, and the defeat of the other side,
would thus be only the partial and incomplete work that progresses ineluctably to an equilibrium
between both powers and characters. It is only with the simultaneous defeat of both sides that
157
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absolute right is fulfilled and that the Ethical Substance has emerged as the negative power, that is,
as the almighty and just Fate, which swallows up both sides. 160

Thus, to borrow Hegel’s classical allusion, Creon (“human law”) at last realizes his damnation in
victory over Antigone (“divine law”) with the consequent deaths of his wife and son, crying, “So
senseless, so insane…my crimes…I don’t even exist—I’m no one. Nothing.”161 Resolution—
synthesis—comes only in the destruction of both competing forces.
Although Ibn Khaldun’s dialectic is considerably less pronounced than Hegel’s and lacks
either its temporal immediacy or philosophical immanence162, he nevertheless envisions a similar
fate for ‘asabiyya upon the creation of a territorial state. Asabiyya’s erosion takes time—indeed,
generations—but it is the necessary consequence of one ‘asabiyya’s victory over another.
Ibn Khaldun argues that the process of decay generally takes three or four generations
(between 120-160 years) to complete, but can occur earlier or later under certain conditions.163
The decay begins with the group’s settlement and steady urbanization, moving periodically
through five distinct stages. According to Ibn Khaldun, these stages correspond to various points
during the lifecycle of a human being: birth, maturation, senility, and death.164
Following the birth of the state, the new ruling dynasty, headed by a single ruler
appointed by virtue of strength and birth, claims all glory for himself and begins the process of
building and expanding a stable and prosperous state. Ibn Khaldun argues that this first stage is
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“that of success.” He states, “In this stage, the ruler serves as model to his people by the manner
in which he acquires glory, collects taxes, defends property, and provides military protection.”165
This generation of the dynasty is that which brings the state into maturity: although its ‘asabiyya
is weaker because of its sedentary establishment, members of the new polity still share the
memories of their struggles, still pull together in common purpose, and still honor one another. It
is in the second stage of the state’s development that the cracks in solidarity begin to show.
In the second stage, the ruling dynasty consolidates its power. Where before the ruler
acted in consideration of and consultation with his people, he now excludes them and seeks to
subdue their interests. He seeks to acquire more power and wealth for his own “house” (royal
family) as a means of distancing himself from all others.166 Once accomplished, he settles into
the luxurious lifestyle of the dynasty his displaced.167 Ibn Khaldun claims this shift to be only
natural, given the new dynasty’s nomadically Spartan roots. He writes,
From the necessities of life and a life of austerity, they [the new dynasty] progress to the luxuries
and life of comfort and beauty…When this purpose is accomplished, all efforts cease…They
prefer rest and quiet and tranquility.168

Such changes cause a pronounced fissure in ‘asabiyya as the ruling elite grows
accustomed to peace and wealth, separates itself from the mass of society, and no longer shares a
common purpose. Where competition once existed in pursuit of martial glory, Ibn Khaldun
argues that, once sedentary, the ruling elite “vie with other nations” and one another “in
delicacies, gorgeous raiment, and fine mounts” instead. In an argument Thorstein Veblen would
certainly appreciate, Ibn Khaldun states this competition among the elite to outdo one another in
luxury extends to the following generations, with each subsequent generation attempting to
165
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eclipse its predecessor in opulence. However, in doing so, each generation removed from the
founding dynasty grows weaker, increasingly disinterested in good governance, farther removed
in manners and mores from its people, and more corrupt.169 Thus, the group’s former unity,
strength, and purpose—its ‘asabiyya—steadily disintegrates.
Once such decay sets in, Ibn Khaldun argues that the dynasty approaches senility and its
final three stages. It is during senility that ‘asabiyya all but disappears and the popular perception
of the rulers and their dynasty gradually shifts from one of respect and awe to one of contempt,
disgust, and eventual hatred.170 This shift corresponds to the increasing incidence of injustice and
maltreatment at the hands of the dynasty. Compounded by the growing political and military
weakness of the elite, recurring injustices bring about the collapse of the state—either internally
or externally.
As Ibn Khaldun explains, state collapse is made possible by two systemically linked
factors: mishandling of the economy and degeneration of society. In examining both aspects, it is
extremely useful to compare Ibn Khaldun’s assessments to those of Machiavelli and Locke.
Machiavelli, for example, wrote extensively on the subjects of sociopolitical disintegration in
The Prince and his Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. Locke, in addition, wrote
extensively on economic predation (specifically on taxation and property) in his Second Treatise
of Government. To compare Ibn Khaldun to both authors, we break down their arguments
thematically into two categories: economy and society.
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Economy

Ibn Khaldun devotes considerable space to discussing the economic ills that befall a state
in decline and how their compounding effects act, in a sense, like a positive feedback cycle,
beginning, then perpetuating, a downward spiral that leads to economic ruin and precipitates
state collapse. The roots of the problem lie in elite overconsumption and predatory taxation
naturally endemic to politically established, sedentary, decaying ‘asabiyya.171 Ibn Khaldun
begins his discussion with the problem of over-taxation.
As previously noted, Ibn Khaldun asserts that, “By its very nature, royal authority claims
all glory for itself and goes in for luxury and prefers tranquility and peace.” 172 Sustained luxury
requires revenue and sustained revenues require domestic income generation. Thus, for Ibn
Khaldun, taxation is merely a natural byproduct of royal authority’s endemic demands. This is
not to say he approves of them. Indeed, he is quick to differentiate between legitimate taxation
and arbitrary, predatory taxation. Legitimate taxation is based upon the laws of Islam, which,
according to Ibn Khaldun’s Maliki reading of fiqh, demand the payment of zakat (annual
charitable ‘tithe’)173, the land tax, the poll tax, and no more.174 Even these, he seems to view as
necessary irritations.
Like Locke, who, according to Dunn, denies the state’s right to demand any form of
financial or proprietary imposition upon the individual175, Ibn Khaldun vociferously denounces
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taxation as “a sign of oppression and meekness that proud souls do not tolerate.”176 However,
like Locke, Ibn Khaldun nevertheless recognizes the government’s requirement to raise
revenue177, and instead shifts his denunciation of taxation in all forms to that which is either
overly burdensome, arbitrary, or both. Such taxes he deems illegitimate, but sees no way around.
The proliferation of illegitimate taxes upon the citizenry is an inescapable historical fact, for as
‘asabiyya decays, ordinary people can no longer defend themselves against elite oppression:
“They have submitted to meekness, and…meekness is an obstacle [to defending oneself through
‘asabiyya].”178 This imposition, Ibn Khaldun argues, contributes to the steady smothering of free
enterprise, immiseration of the poor and alienation of the ruled from the rulers, thereby hastening
the collapse of society.179 Just as the declining stages of royal authority progress slowly,
however, so too does this feedback cycle of taxation and immiseration/alienation.
Ibn Khaldun notes, for example, “at the beginning of a dynasty, taxation yields a large
revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from
large assessments.”180 This is because at the time ‘asabiyya becomes invested in a sedentary
state, the elites’ appetite for luxury is nascent, unrefined, and relatively small. Dynasties initially
maintain their “Bedouin attitude” and therefore have few needs beyond subsistence. Thus, Ibn
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Khaldun argues, “revenue from taxes pays for much more than necessary expenditure, and there
is a large surplus.”181
Once some time passes182, however, the old “Bedouin”183 habits of the elite give way to
the tranquil and luxurious customs of sedentary culture.184 It does not take long for these customs
to become routinized within the dynasty as the Bedouin “attitude of simplicity” and “qualities of
moderation and restraint” disappear.185 In their place, dynamics of “conspicuous consumption”
become the primary driving force behind increasing government expenditures.186 The result,
according to Ibn Khaldun, is a steady rise in overall expenses, especially on the part of the ruler
and the dynastic elite, with a correspondingly negative impact on society generally.187 At length,
he writes:

At first, the amounts of individual imposts and assessments are increased; then, as expenses and
needs increase under the influence of the gradual growth of luxury customs and additional
allowances for the militia, the dynasty is affected by senility…the revenue from taxes decreases,
while the habits (requiring money) increase. As they increase, salaries and allowances to the
soldiers also increase. Therefore, the ruler must invent new kinds of taxes. He levies them on
commerce. He imposes taxes of a certain amount on prices realized in the markets and on the
various (imported) goods at the city gates…In the (later) years of a dynasty, (taxation) may
become excessive…Business falls off, because all hopes (of profit) are destroyed, permitting the
dissolution of civilization…This (situation) becomes more and more aggravated, until the dynasty
disintegrates.188

According to Ibn Khaldun, a correlative relationship exists between levels of government
expenses/taxes and levels of civilian (“subject”) productivity. Therefore, if increasing
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government expenditures drive taxes too high, fiscal pressures upon merchants become too great,
profit and capital disappear from the marketplace, and the incentive to work vanishes.189 Because
the government cannot reduce spending and can no longer rely on taxes upon private businesses
or individuals, it is forced to “nationalize” enterprises, thereby monopolizing market sectors and
eliminating competitors. Fiscal revenue decreases further and the state must continue to
nationalize in order to maintain itself, pursue its interest, and sustain the opulence of its elite.190
For Ibn Khaldun, this positive feedback cycle represents an irreversible mechanism of dynastic
economics—one in which an initial “fiscal optimum” balancing state expenses and revenues is
steadily but inexorably replaced by crippling fiscal policies and economic collapse.191
Exacerbating this fiscal malaise, Ibn Khaldun sees a concomitant rise in the unjust state
appropriation of private property. Like Locke, Ibn Khaldun places a high premium on the role
property (and the drive for its acquisition) plays in building and sustaining civilization. Although
he doesn’t go quite as far as Locke, who argues that the natural desire to protect property is the
sine qua non of all civil society192, Ibn Khaldun imbues the concept of property with strong
economic and social values.
First, property rights, like tax levels, are directly related to individual economic
productivity. Ibn Khaldun writes, “The extent and degree to which property rights are infringed
upon determines the extent to and degree to which the efforts of the subjects to acquire property
slacken.”193 The logical implication here is that, if governed by a ruler or state that respects
individual private property, people will naturally seek to acquire more, thereby stimulating
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increased economic activity and growth. In addition to their economic value, property rights
carry significant social weight as a measurement of an individual’s value in society vis-à-vis his
or her sovereign. That is, Ibn Khaldun believes a just society to be a “welfare-oriented” society
in which individual rights—such as property—are respected by the state.194
The major (and inevitable) conflict that arises in his concept of history, however, is
between the normative demands of (Islamic) society and the natural demands of royal authority.
Among the outcomes of this conflict is the arbitrary expropriation of property by the state, which
initiates the fifth and final stage of dynastic rule. Ibn Khaldun describes this stage as one of
“waste and squandering,” in which the ruler systematically alienates himself from his people by
wasting the wealth accumulated by his forbearers on “pleasures and amusements,” seeking to
destroy the elite ruling class out of fear of usurpation, and—most importantly—unjustly
expropriating private property to pay for his frivolities, vanity projects, and mercenary
protection.195 Combined with excessive and overbearing taxation, Ibn Khaldun sees this practice
as the final injustice committed by a degenerate state whose ‘asabiyya is gone:

Injustice should not be understood to imply only the confiscation of money or other property from
the owners, without compensation and without cause. It is commonly understood in that way, but
it is something more general than that…People who collect unjustified taxes commit an injustice.
Those who infringe upon property commit an injustice. Those who take away property commit an
injustice. Those who deny people their rights commit an injustice. Those who, in general, take
property by force, commit an injustice. It is the dynasty that suffers from these acts, inasmuch as
civilization, which is the substance of the dynasty, is ruined. 196

The picture Ibn Khaldun therefore presents is one of naked state exploitation at the expense of its
citizenry. But the economic side is only one side of coin. To grasp a fuller understanding of how
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Ibn Khaldun envisions the decay of ‘asabiyya and, with it, the state, we must now examine its
social effects.

Society
Ibn Khaldun grounds his discussion of ‘asabiyya’s social deterioration in his concept of
‘umran, or human society through time.197 In his lengthy treatment of ‘umran (a thesis topic in
its own right), Ibn Khaldun argues that the concept of a society through time, or society-asdynamic-process, needs to be differentiated into two distinct categories: nomadic cum rural
society (‘umran badawi) and urban, “civilized” society (‘umran hadari).198 He does this along
material and, interestingly, normative lines. In so doing, Ibn Khaldun prefaces his social analysis
of ‘asabiyya’s decay and state collapse.199
Ibn Khaldun first locates ‘umran badawi and ‘umran hadari within environmental
typologies. ‘Umran badawi, which he associates with Arab Bedouins and Berber mountain
dwellers (among others), is characterized by its attachment to the “desert.” 200 This single
component both determines and defines all aspects of the “Bedouin” lifestyle and character:
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hardiness, simplicity, bellicosity, courage, loyalty, and religiosity201—all of which Ibn Khaldun
normatively associates with a virtuous society.202 It is this combination of qualities, Ibn Khaldun
argues, that produces the strongest ‘asabiyya and enables such societies to conquer wealthier,
numerically larger, and militarily superior urban societies.
The polar opposite of this rugged character is that of ‘umran hadari or sedentary,
“civilized” society. Again, locating his conception within an environmental framework, Ibn
Khaldun associates ‘umran hadari with the great urban civilizations of the world—the Persians,
Arabs, Turks, and, to a lesser degree, the “Franks and Spaniards.” While Ibn Khaldun sees the
initial establishment of sedentary, urban societies as beneficial, the benefits do not last long.
Positing a degenerative property inherent to urbanity, he argues that the chief characteristics of
sedentary society morph from those of ‘umran badawi into luxury, weakness, cowardice,
gluttony, treachery, vice, and irreligion. This degenerative process in society is unavoidable and
corresponds to Ibn Khaldun’s “five stages” of civilization.
To make his point, Ibn Khaldun points to the two great “civilizations” with which he is
most familiar: Al-Andalus and the Maghreb under the Umayyads, and Abassid Arabia. He
argues that the establishment of urban empires following the Arab Muslim conquests led
inexorably to their destruction.203 Concomitant luxury and peace hastened the decay of once
strong tribal-Islamic ‘asabiyyas, thereby breeding weakness, irreligion, vice, and moral
debasement. This debasement irrevocably led to the collapse of social and governmental
cohesion. Having all but destroyed itself from within, each empire stood helpless when
confronted by internal and external challenges to its rule. The Umayyads succumbed to the
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internal division of their empire by competing clans204 and the Abbasids crumbled under the
Mongol invasion.205 In one lengthy passage, Ibn Khaldun describes the process of how these
Arab empires dissolved. As the dynasty progressed from one generation to the next,

…they neglected religion. Thus, they forgot political leadership and returned to their desert. They
were ignorant of the connection of their [‘asabiyya] with the people of the ruling dynasty, because
subservience and lawful (government) had become strange to them. They became once again as
savage as they had been before. The epithet ‘royal’ was no longer applicable to them, except in so
far as it applied to the caliphs who were (Arab) by race. When the caliphate disappeared and was
wiped out, governmental power passed altogether out of their hands. Non-Arabs took over their
power, and they remained as Bedouins in the desert, ignorant of royal authority and political
leadership. Most Arabs do not even know that they possessed royal authority in the past, or that no
nation had ever exercised such (sweeping) royal authority as had their race…When the Arabs
forgot their religion, they no longer had any connection with political leadership, and they returned
to their desert origins. At times, they achieve superiority over weak dynasties, as is the case in the
contemporary Maghrib [sic]. But their domination leads only to the ruin of the civilization they
conquer.206

In Ibn Khaldun’s view, the Arabs of his era are too far removed from ‘asabiyya and royal
authority, too much debased in manner and temperament, to reclaim their past glories of
conquest. Through his analysis of history, he implicitly argues that his contemporaneous
generations have forgotten the legacies and lessons of their ancestors, and are, therefore,
incapable of forging a strong, renewed ‘asabiyya.207 It is a decidedly pessimistic view that offers
“no possibility of renewal from within.”208 Interestingly, Niccolo Machiavelli and Edward
Gibbon echo this essential argument in their histories on the rise and fall of the Roman Republic
and Roman Empire. Gibbon’s famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters in The Decline and Fall of
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the Roman Empire discuss precisely this Khaldunian idea of irredeemable internal decay.209
Similarly, in his analysis of the Roman Republic’s collapse Machiavelli makes the case that:

In the beginning, all states command a certain amount of respect, so popular government survived
for a while, but not for long, especially once the generation that had established it passed away. It
quickly degenerated into anarchy…Usually, while a state is torn apart by internal dissent, and as a
result is weakened and deprived of good leadership, it is conquered by a neighboring state better
organized than it is.210

Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy is replete with passages like this describing the process
of sociopolitical disintegration through growing state corruption and irreligion. In the first case—
that of state corruption—Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun share similar views. As noted earlier, Ibn
Khaldun sees corruption arising from royal authority’s inherent aspiration to luxury combined
with the steady decay of ‘asabiyya. As Stowasser argues, “When asabiyya goes, all personal and
political virtue goes with it. This is true for the individual ruler as well as for the nation. The
presence of asabiyya is indicated by and calls forth good and virtuous deed whereas its absence
calls forth and is indicated by vice and evil deeds.”211 Like Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli also
worries about the rise of corruption among state rulers and the ruled.
Corruption presents several challenges to good governance for Machiavelli. First,
corruption among both rulers and the ruled renders civil law useless, which, in turn, breeds
popular chaos and state tyranny.212 Second, once routinized, the cycle of corruption makes any
kind of social, legal, or political reform all but impossible, for, “just as good habits need good
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laws if they are to survive, so good laws will only be obeyed if the subjects have good habits.”213
This concern leads both Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun to the topic of religion and the role it plays
in society.
In the case of religion and the state, Machiavelli’s arguments from The Discourses bear
striking similarity to those of Ibn Khaldun. Consider, for example, Machiavelli’s admonishment,

Those rulers and those republics who want to keep their political systems free of corruption must
above all else prevent the ceremonies of their religion from being corrupted and must keep them
always in due veneration. For one can have no better indication of the prospective ruin of a society
than to see that divine worship is held in contempt…rulers of a republic or of a kingdom should
uphold the basic principles of the religion to which they are committed. If they do this it will be
easy for them to keep their state religious and, as a consequence, law-abiding and united.214

compared to this from Ibn Khaldun:

…injustice ruins civilization, which has as its consequence the complete destruction of the
dynasty…Injustice should not be understood to imply only the confiscation of money or other
property from the owners…Those who deny people their rights commit an injustice…This is what
Muhammad actually had in mind when he forbade injustice. He meant the resulting destruction
and ruin of civilization, which ultimately permits the eradication of the human species. This is
what the religious law quite generally and wisely aims at in emphasizing five things as necessary:
the preservation of (1) religion, (2) the soul (life), (3) the intellect, (4) progeny, and (5)
property.215

Like Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli sees religion as both a unifying, cohesive force in society, and a
significant legitimizing force in politics. He uses an example from the Conflict of the Orders216
to demonstrate the point. Machiavelli describes how the senate used a call to religious principle
to convince Roman plebeians, then in open conflict with the patrician socioeconomic and
political establishment, to set aside their differences and unite against the Volsci and Aequi
213
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tribes, with whom Rome was at war. He writes that, in doing so, “religion made it possible for
the senate to overcome problems that, without its assistance, they would never have been able to
overcome.”217 For both authors, then, religion represents the sociolegal adhesive that keeps civil
society civil and sustains the legitimacy of the politically enforced order. Combined with the loss
of ‘asabiyya (which Stowasser speciously ties to Machiavelli’s concept of virtú218), the lack of
religious belief and practice steadily undermines the ruling dynasty’s ability to successfully
reproduce itself, thereby leading to its ultimate demise and potential overthrow.
Among the leading symptoms of this phenomenon that both Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli
recognize is a ruler’s choice to employ mercenary troops as the chief instrument of state defense.
In The Prince, Machiavelli warns against using mercenaries for two reasons: they are both
useless and dangerous.219 On the first count, mercenaries have no motive to fight beyond
financial gain, which makes them easy traitors. On the second count, they have no vested interest
beyond their persons, which makes them quick cowards in the field. Thus, Machiavelli argues,
“Anyone who relies on mercenary troops to keep himself in power will never be safe or secure,
for they are factious, ambitious, ill-disciplined, treacherous.”220
Likewise, Ibn Khaldun states that a dynasty employs “partisans” only after it has reached
“senility.”221 He argues that the generations succeeding the dynasty’s founders, having grown up
in luxury and peace, are too lazy and weak to defend themselves:

they forget the customs of desert life…Their military defence [sic] weakens, their energy is lost
and their strength is undermined…Eventually, they come to depend upon some other militia.222
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The implication Ibn Khaldun makes is that a dynasty employing mercenaries is already
vulnerable to internal and/or external attack. Its ‘asabiyya is long dead. Were it still intact, the
defense of the dynasty would equate to the defense of society as a whole. Instead, the dynasty
has fallen victim to a “chronic disease” for which no cure exists.223
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CHAPTER SIX: REIMAGINING STATE COLLAPSE IN THE MUQADDIMAH – A
CASE FOR ETHICS, REBELLION, & REBIRTH
Ibn Khaldun “In Spite of Himself”
The preceding comparative treatments of Ibn Khaldun’s thought on human nature,
sovereignty, and ‘asabiyya lead us to two potential conclusions regarding the fate of civilizations
or, in the contemporary world, states. The first, inferred by many readers past and present—
particularly in times of economic, social, and political decline or depression—is that there is
simply no stopping the vicious Khaldunian cycle of rise, decline, and violent collapse. The ride
goes on and we can’t get off. This profoundly pessimistic assessment, which many label
‘realistic,’ is seen time and again in the work of modern historians and political scientists from
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall to Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics.224 It is
noteworthy in this context, for example, that Ottoman academics and statesmen only
‘rediscovered’ and translated Ibn Khaldun into Turkish in the mid 19th century, as their empire
steadily crumbled around them.225 Oddly, they sought to understand only the reasons for their
empire’s demise, rather than the potential remedies—and therein lies the root to discerning an
alternative reading of The Muqaddimah.
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Most standard interpretations of the Khaldunian cycle emphasize its historical-structural
components and minimize or eliminate the potential agency of humans in affecting its course. 226
For many, the cycle’s teleology imputes a futility to human action when confronted with the
evidence of social disintegration. One scholar goes so far as to argue Ibn Khaldun’s entire
philosophy of history serves as “an extended commentary on the futility of human aspiration.” 227
This understanding belies one of Ibn Khaldun’s central premises of stable civilization and
responsible rulership, however. For, no matter how bleak Ibn Khaldun’s final assessment, one
cannot overlook his deep concern with what we might call social justice in an ethical society.
As we have seen, Ibn Khaldun believes the very reason propelling social dissolution to be
a willful, continued abrogation of that justice and perversion of those ethics. The title of a later
chapter in The Muqaddimah speaks to this point: “Injustice brings about the ruin of
civilization.”228 Civilization cannot survive without justice, and there is no justice without the
protection of peoples’ rights.229 While we might have a lengthy and fruitful debate over how one
might define and constitute “rights” in a 14th century Maghrebi-Islamic context, the intent
supporting Ibn Khaldun’s proposition speaks volumes in itself.
So what do we make of this seeming contradiction? If a civilization is doomed to
degenerative extinction at the moment of its founding, why should it matter whether or not it is
just? But here is where we trip over ourselves in the attempt to understand Ibn Khaldun: when he
discusses the “disintegration” and “ruin” of civilization, does he mean its physical eradication?
Scholars like Gibbon or Gilpin would say he does—in a salted earth-like reading of hegemonic
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collapse via conquest230—but this reading is deeply flawed. It imposes a myopically simplistic
interpretation of the Khaldunian cycle onto the text—an interpretation that corrupts the depth of
Ibn Khaldun’s thought in two significant ways.
First, this reading either dismisses or denies the religious-ethical foundations of Ibn
Khaldun’s thought.231 Contemporary scholars (especially in the West) become so enamored of
the ‘modern’ language throughout The Muqaddimah, with its emphasis on rational historical
inquiry, its self-critique of society and urbanization, and its assessment of society and politics ‘as
they are’ instead of ‘as they should be’ (à la Machiavelli and Thucydides, so goes the argument),
that they either unwittingly blind themselves to Ibn Khaldun’s Islamic conceptions of ethical
life232 or, as Mahdi argues, treat those realities as

residues of the prejudices and dogmatisms of the Middle Ages from which a Muslim thinker in the
fourteenth century could not liberate himself.233

In either case, by unconsciously or deliberately secularizing Ibn Khaldun’s ideas, contemporary
scholars miss the important normative commitments he makes in his sociopolitical analyses.
To secularize Ibn Khaldun denies, for example, the principal place he gives religious law
in guaranteeing the protection of popular rights234 or the position he takes on social justice and
the role government must play in upholding it if civilization is to survive.235 How does one
reconcile the following premise, that
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Anything (done by royal authority) that is dictated by force, superiority, or the free play of the
power of wrathfulness, is tyranny and injustice and considered reprehensible by (the religious
law)…Likewise, anything (done by royal authority) that is dictated by considerations of policy or
political decisions without supervision of the religious law, is also reprehensible, because it is
vision lacking the divine light.236

with the popularly shared image of Ibn Khaldun as a hard political realist who either directly
opposes religious coloring in social inquiry or simply pays religion lip service as a means of
placating the censors and state officials of his time?237 The simple answer is that one can’t. To
divorce Ibn Khaldun from his Islamic intellectual milieu and ethical foundation is akin to reading
only books One and Two of Leviathan, conveniently neglecting Hobbes’ third book on the moral
obligations of a “Christian Commonwealth.” The same could be said for reading Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right without acknowledging the author’s German Protestant commitments. To
read Ibn Khaldun outside the context of Islam eliminates the potential for seeing in the cyclical
process of state collapse a potential for social reconstitution and rebirth, which brings us to the
second aspect misinterpretation.
The popular reading of the Khaldunian cycle focuses heavily—if not exclusively—on the
role external actors play in cementing a state’s downfall through conquest or forced capitulation
and ‘regime change’. This reading both ignores Ibn Khaldun’s complete understanding of the
dialectic cycle and denies the potential agency of a society’s lower strata in reconstituting and
reconstructing a new ‘asabiyya to overthrow and supplant their degenerate rulers from below.
Ibn Khaldun specifically notes the potential of internal insurrection unseating a dynasty
after it grows “senile.” In his treatment of how prestige and royal authority decrease through
subsequent generations, for example, Ibn Khaldun writes that the ruler begins to alienate himself
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from those in whose [‘asabiyya] he shares, thinking that he is better than they. He trusts that (they
will obey him because) he was brought up to take their obedience for granted, and he does not
know the qualities that made obedience necessary…Therefore, he considers them despicable, and
they, in turn, revolt against him and despise him. They transfer leadership from him and his direct
lineage to some other related branch, in obedience to their [‘asabiyya], after they have convinced
themselves that the qualities of the (new ruler) are satisfactory to them. 238

In addition to the potential revolt of disgruntled subjects, Ibn Khaldun argues that domestic
factions and former allies originally subsumed under the dynasty’s ‘asabiyya are just as likely to
rise against a ruler who falls prey to the established “chronic disease” of “senility”.239 He argues,

Time gets the upper hand over the original group (in power). Their prowess disappears as the
result of senility…Time feasts on them, as their energy is exhausted by well-being and their
vigour [sic] drained by the nature of luxury. They reach their limit, the limit that is set by the
nature of human urbanization and political superiority. At that moment, the [‘asabiyya] of other
people (within the same nation) is strong. Their force cannot be broken…Their superiority it
recognized, and, therefore, no one disputes their claim to royal authority. They seize power. 240

Why modern scholarship largely overlooks these rather clear passages is the subject for another
study. Suffice it to say that a great deal of additional explanatory force is lost as a result. By
placing the locus of social and political change exclusively on external actors, scholars eliminate
the possibility of internal renewal through rebellion. Combined with the neglect of Ibn Khaldun’s
normative concerns like social justice and good governance, this externalized reading strips The
Muqaddimah of its ethical substance and imposes a modern, Western version of Realpolitik upon
Ibn Khaldun’s conception of historical social change. As we will find, reclaiming that substance
alters this understanding considerably.
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Reclaiming the Ethical Significance of Ibn Khaldun’s Thought

What, then, are the implications of rereading The Muqaddimah with these two additional
criteria in mind? How does the incorporation of a domestically oriented reading of the
Khaldunian cycle combined with the recognition of Ibn Khaldun’s normative Islamic principles
alter our perception of his theory of cyclical social change? In a word, his ideas become
subversive. With the combined lenses of domestic unrest and normative ethics we see a new way
of interpreting and understanding Ibn Khaldun, the implications of which are manifold.
In the first place, we see that not only does Ibn Khaldun accept the possibility of internal
state revolt during a dynasty’s final ruling stages, but, following the logic of his normative
commitments, he also legitimizes and tacitly (but conditionally) supports such rebellion.
Consider these four premises understood either implicitly or explicitly by Ibn Khaldun:

1. There is no higher power than God and no higher authority than God’s law. All human
moral/ethical standards are derived from God’s guidance.241

2. For civilization to survive certain ethical standards must be upheld by the dynastic
government, which is composed of both an administrative elite and the single
authoritative ruler;242

3. These ethical standards of government protected rights, unabridged social justice, and the
ruler’s obligation to his/her people243 create a kind of sacred bond between ruler and
ruled;244
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4. When repeatedly violated during the later degenerative stages of the dynasty’s rule, this
bond naturally dissolves245 along with the subjects’ original requirements of
subordination, obedience, and allegiance; for, as God instructs in the Qur’an,
“persecution is more serious than killing;”246

5. A true Muslim fights persecution and oppression until it is no more and God’s law is
restored;247

Therefore, protestations from al-Mawardi, al-Ghazali, and H. A. R. Gibb248 aside, we can infer
that a rebellion to overthrow a morally decrepit and unjust government is both legitimate and
favorable in the thought of Ibn Khaldun if and only if its ultimate purpose is to restore God’s
guiding principles as the ruling principles of the state, thereby saving civilization and
reestablishing ethical governance.
By reincorporating Ibn Khaldun’s ethical substance into our understanding of The
Muqaddimah, we get a much richer perspective on what he considers to be legitimate
governance, how he sees it dissolve, and how he believes it can be potentially restored. In an
ironic twist, Ibn Khaldun’s religious conservatism and pessimism regarding the human
“temperament” logically lead him to a position condoning political insurrection—if only to
reestablish the state’s original moral order.
Of course, while Ibn Khaldun’s ideas give this proposition normative weight—in the
sense that, if possible it would be preferable to social extinction—it is nevertheless considerably
more circumstantial and speculative in nature than the dialectical cycle of historical change that
245
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dominates his thought. Ibn Khaldun might think a rebellion to restore justice legitimate, but,
relative to the odds of internal social implosion and external conquest, his emphasis on collapse
and transition suggests serious doubts of its probability. Nevertheless, its granted potential in Ibn
Khaldun’s thought adds a flickering ray of hope to an otherwise dismal assessment of human
civilization.

The Khaldunian Cycle in Action? An Interpretive Reading of Modern History

What does a domestically concerned ethical reappraisal mean for our understanding of
The Muqaddimah? It means, first, that Ibn Khaldun’s brilliance goes far beyond sociology and
philosophy of history, extending to the realm of normative political theory—limited as it may be
by the contexts of time and place. More interestingly, it lends Ibn Khaldun’s ideas even greater
philosophical depth and generalizability when we consider modern and contemporary history.
Among other phenomena, this interpretation offers an intriguing rereading of the recent popular
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, their historical roots, social processes, and current trajectories.
How might we frame such a narrative?
We could start by looking at how the former regimes of Tunisia and Egypt came to
power. In each case, the group that ascended did so under the guidance of a strong leader who
sustained and strengthened his group’s ‘asabiyya relative to that of his competitors. Furthermore,
Nasser249 and Bourguiba250 initially seized power with substantial popular support legitimized by
the infusion of nationalism (what Ibn Khaldun might call a modern equivalent to religion in
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terms of its socially unifying capacity251) with their groups’ political acumen and will to power.
This combination—strong leader, strong group ‘asabiyya relative to the status quo, popular
support legitimized252 and cemented by nationalism—allowed each party to assume and retain
power for decades. It did not take long, however, for ruler and/or his successors to destroy their
groups’ ‘asabiyyas and alienate a majority of their citizens.
Looking at the rapid decay of group ‘asabiyya relative to the Arab uprisings makes a
Khaldunian interpretation particularly fascinating. For when we examine the four to five decade
histories of each country following the establishment of the Nasserist and Neo-Destour regimes,
we see how clearly the process of decay follows Ibn Khaldun’s line of argument. In each case,
the ruler was at first popular. Through public works projects, economic restructuring,
industrialization, and welfare programs, he sought to simultaneously better the lives of his people
and increase the stature of his state.253 This initial “stage” lasted no more than a decade.
After the first stage in which the ruler successfully established himself, his party, and his
ideology as the living, righteous embodiment of the state, his ‘asabiyya began to fade and
popular support with it. Habits of luxury, corruption, cronyism, and repression became
entrenched as governing norms among elites while the veneer of nationalism and the cult of the
leader slowly eroded among the citizenry and gave way to the realities of socioeconomic
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exploitation.254 In Tunisia, the social, economic, and political policies articulated by
“Bourguibisme” lost their allure.255 In Egypt, the project of Arab Nationalism crumbled under its
own weight and the demoralizing defeat at Israeli hands in 1967.256 The loss of their nationalist
facades gradually exposed each regime for what it was: autocratic, elitist, repressive, and
exploitative.
Over the years and down the lines of succession, these characteristics became more and
more pronounced. What remnant of ‘asabiyya there might have been largely disappeared among
the masses. As income gaps between rulers and ruled increased, as political opposition became
increasingly intolerable, and as regimes became more interested in their own self-perpetuation
and replication than the well being of their people, popular resistance rapidly took shape. Egypt
experienced massive student demonstrations and growing opposition among devout—sometimes
‘radical’ and violent—Muslims.257 Tunisia saw mounting pressure from labor unions and
lawyers’ organizations.258 In each case, ruling ‘asabiyya had extinguished by the turn of the
century; justice ceased to function, people were preyed upon rather than protected, and force
alone kept the regime in power.259 As Ibn Khaldun would argue, such conditions signified the
regime’s senility and paved the way for its overthrow.
Thus, we approach the historical aspect of change that our new understanding of Ibn
Khaldun renders both timely and necessary: overthrow from below. In the rebellions that swept
across Arab states—and, in some cases, continue to rage—we saw how the reconstruction of
social ‘asabiyya around the desire to reestablish justice and end state exploitation united
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hundreds of thousands against their erstwhile autocrats. Instead of a foreign power forcing the
regime into submission by strength alone, a majority of citizens stood together in the belief that
they had right on their side, strength in their numbers, and the willingness to die for their
cause.260 As Goodman (and Ibn Khaldun) would argue, they needed little else to unseat a long
degenerate regime.261
Of course, the reality is more complex—Tunisian and Egyptian citizens had help from
their non-intervening militaries, constant scrutiny from the international press corps, and
mounting pressure from the ‘international community’.262 Nevertheless, in states once written off
by the West as potentially perpetual havens of authoritarianism, average people proved that
‘asabiyya rebuilt on the commitment to social justice and reform cannot be placated or pacified
when standing against oppression and corruption. In each case Ibn Khaldun might argue that,
through just rebellion, “civilization” earned a new lease on life.

Concluding Remarks

Despite the difficulties imposed by the historical-contextual limits of time and place, Ibn
Khaldun’s work remains a testament to individual intellectual genius. His ideas inspire new
questions and bring new meaning to the study of political theory, long dominated and suffocated
by an overreliance on Western thought. Through careful comparison to that canon, this study has
sought to simultaneously deepen and strengthen extant understandings of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas
while unearthing additional aspects either marginalized or neglected by the predominant
scholarship. Moreover, it has attempted to demonstrate Ibn Khaldun’s lasting contribution and
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value to the modern social sciences—especially as it relates to the study of political rebellion and
social change. While I leave the final verdict of the project to my readers, I hope at least to have
raised awareness and elicited questions that will continue to drive work on Ibn Khaldun’s ideas
forward.
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